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guest statute 10 in that state didn't protect the owner from liability
because the statute required that the automobile be moving and the
person be injured while riding, though in each case the common
purpose had not been abandoned.
The present case has been well decided in view of the narrow
wording of the statute. There exists, however, the dilemma of the
legislature endeavoring to protect the car owner from liability for
ordinary negligence to a gratuitous guest, and the judiciary forced
into declaring the injured party not a guest, thus saving for him a
right of action which existed prior to the statutes when he might
well have been deemed a guest. The courts are blameless. It is the
duty of the legislature to choose more accurate language and until
they do so, the courts must interpret the statutes as they are written.
J. I. L.

TORTS-LANDLORD AND TENANT-LIABILITY FOR LATENT DE-

FECTS-IMPLIED WARRANTY.-Plaintiff tenant was injured when a

wall-bed in her furnished apartment became disengaged from the
fastenings on the door as she lowered the bed. For fourteen months
the bed had been used by plaintiff and was apparently in good condition. Held, judgment for defendant. Even if there is an implied
warranty that a completely furnished apartment is suitable for occupancy, the liability of a landlord for injuries to tenant due to a
defective condition or faulty construction of demised premises is confined to the condition of the premises at the beginning of the term.
With respect to conditions arising subsequently there is no liability
in the absence of proof that landlord had knowledge of the defect.
Forrester v. Hoover Hotel & Investment Co., - Cal. App. 2d -,
196 P. 2d 825 (1948).
The theory of warranty of habitability of premises leased furnished emanated from England ' and was met with disfavor in all
jurisdictions in the United States with the exception of Massachusetts. 2 New York repudiated the doctrine in an early case.3 The
holding has never been overruled and is the settled law of the state.
In the Pennington decision 4 California conformed with the precedent
established in England and Massachusetts. The ruling was based on
a California statute providing that a depositor must indemnify the
10 CALIFORNIA VEHICLE ACT ST. 1929 as phrased in Smith v. Pope, spra
note 7. Any person who as a guest accepts a ride in any vehicle, moving
upon any of the public highways . . . and while so riding receives . . . an
injury shall have no right of recovery against the owner.
1
Smith v. Marrable, 11 M. & W. 5.
2
WALSH, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 287 (2d ed. 1937).
3 Franklin v. Brown, 118 N. Y. 110, 23 N. E. 126 (1889).
4 Fisher v. Pennington, 116 Cal. App. 248, 2 P. 2d 518 (1931).
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depositary for all damages caused to him by the defects or vices of
the thing deposited. 5 It was this holding on which plaintiff in the
instant case relied. However, the California Court of Appeals refused to extend the doctrine beyond the narrow confines of a defect
arising at the beginning of the term 6 and reiterated the established
rule: in the absence of fraud, concealment, or covenant in the lease,
a landlord is not liable to a tenant for injuries due to a defective
condition or faulty construction of the demised premises.
Telescoped, where a duty to repair exists, liability for latent defects in all jurisdictions, excluding Massachusetts and possibly California, is predicated on knowledge or notice, actual or constructive.
Barring legislation to that effect no differentiation is made between
furnished and unfurnished apartments. Under the common law there
is no duty to repair except for those portions of the premises reserved
for use in common by the tenants. 7 In New York the common law
duty has been extended to all parts of the demised premises by
statute under the Tenement House Law 8 and the Multiple Dwelling
Law.9 Both at common law and by statute, knowledge or notice,
actual or constructive, is a requisite for imposing liability.
A review of cases on the subject will indicate wherein liability
has been imposed or denied and will bear out the proposition that
liability is conditioned on knowledge. In all cases cited, knowledge
or notice, actual or constructive, has been held a condition precedent
to recovery. Under the common law in New York there is imposed
the additional burden of the exercise of reasonable care in the discovery of defects in the premises demised. 10 In the absence of fraudulent concealment of known latent defects, a landlord not directly
covenanting to repair, is not liable to tenant for injuries resulting
from a defective gas heater." When after a severe rainstorm a stock
of goods was damaged by leakage, it was held there was no absolute
duty on the part of the landlord to keep in repair those portions of
the building over which he reserves domination and control where he
had no notice of such defects. 2 Common law liability for latent
defects is limited to those portions of the leased premises reserved
for use in common with other tenants, or to a direct covenant to
repair,' 3 recovery being conditioned on notice. In general, the same
5 CAL. CIv. CODE § 1833.
6 In the Pennington case the injury occurred during the first month of the
tenancy.
7 PROSSER, TORTS

649 (1941).

8N. Y. TENEMENT HOUSE LAW § 102.
9 N. Y. MULTIPLE DWELLING LAW § 78.
10 Smith v. Donnelly, 45 Misc. 447, 92 N. Y. Supp. 43 (Sup. Ct. 1904).
Contra: Ellis v. McNeese, 109 Cal. App. 667, 293 Pac. 854 (1930).
" Nelson v. Meyers, 94 Cal. App. 66, 270 Pac. 719 (1928).
:12Silver v. Dry Dock Savings Institution, 261 App. Div. 283, 25 N. Y. S.
2d 136 (1st Dep't 1941); Kramer v. Stone, 176 App. Div. 549, 163 N. Y. Supp.

578 (1st Dep't 1917).
13 Liability restricted to the cost of repairs.

PROSSER, TORTS 659 (1941).
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conditions for imposing liability are required as are found requisite
under the Tenement House Law, the Multiple Dwelling Law, and
under common law principles.
Whether California in the future will follow the Pennington
case is a conjectural matter. Nevertheless, in all cases of latent defects arising subsequently to the beginning of the term, California
imposes liability in accord with established principles as exemplified
in the Forrestercase.
M. A. S.

TORTS-LIBEL AND SLANDER-FAIR COMMENT.-The plaintiff

is a district attorney. He commenced this action against a newspaper publisher alleging the publication of two defamatory articles.
The first article stated that a petition had been filed with the governor requesting him to name a competent attorney to conduct an
investigation of a case which the plaintiff had handled. The second
article contained a statement of an attorney criticizing the method in
which the plaintiff had handled the aforementioned case, and by innuendo charged the plaintiff with incompetency. Held, complaint
dismissed. The exercise of the right to petition, quoted in the first
article, cannot be a basis for a defamation suit. The statements constituted an honest criticism of a public official in a matter of public
concern, and as such are not actionable. Tracy v. Kline & Son, Inc.,
274 App. Div. 149 (3d Dep't 1948).
Defamation is "the offense of injuring a person's character, fame
or reputation by false and malicious statements." ' Defamatory matter which is set forth in permanent form such as in writing, constitutes libel. 2 Generally, where there has been a libelous publication,
the law will imply malice and infer some damage. However, certain
publications, referred to as "privileged communications" form an exception to the general rule.3 A "privileged communication" is one
made by a person in the discharge of some legal or moral duty, to
another, who has an interest in receiving it.4 This privilege to publish defamatory matter is either absolute or conditional (qualified).
Absolute privilege will protect the utterer from liability in a law suit
even though the publication is false, defamatory, and inspired by
malice.5 Because of this, the courts tend to restrict the scope of the
absolute privilege rather than extend it.6 Thus, the courts have
LAW DIcTIoNARY (3d ed. 1933).
2SEALY, THE LAW OF TonTs § 169 (1939).
3 Byam v. Collins et al., 111 N. Y. 143, 19 N. E. 75 (1888).
'BLAcx,

4 Klinck v. Colby, 46 N. Y. 427 (1871).
5 Hyman v. Press Publishing Co., 199 App. Div. 609, 192 N. Y. Supp. 47
(1st Dep't 1922).
6Pecue v. West, 233 N. Y. 316, 135 N. E. 515 (1922).

